Keeping Secrets in Resource Aware Components  by Chothia, Tom et al.
Keeping Secrets in Resource Aware
Components
Tom Chothia
CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Jun Pang
Carl von Ossietzky Universita¨t Oldenburg, Oldenburg, Germany
Mohammad Torabi Dashti
CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
We present a powerful and ﬂexible method for automatically checking the secrecy of values inside compo-
nents. In our framework an attacker may monitor the external communication of a component, interact
with it and monitor the components resource usage. We use an automata model of components in which
each transition is tagged with resource usage information. We extend these automata to pass values and
say that a value is kept secret if the observable behaviour of the automata is the same for all possible
instantiations of that value. If a component leaks some, but not all of the information about its secret we
use a notion of secrecy degree to quantify the worst-case leakage. We show how this secrecy degree can
be automatically calculated, for values from a ﬁnite domain, using the μCRL process algebraic veriﬁcation
toolset.
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1 Introduction
Component-based software development allows programs to be reused, interchanged
and even downloaded onto a running system. Sometimes the maker or user of a
component would like to keep some of the data inside the component secret from
other components on the same system. This goal is complicated as the potential
attackers may be running on the same computer as the target component and so
can monitor its resource usage. We develop a framework for automatically check-
ing how well values inside a component are kept secret from an attacker that can
communicate with the component and monitor its resource usage.
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Resource usage or Quality of Service (QoS) aspects of components concern non-
functional properties such as availability, response time, memory usage, etc. Fol-
lowing work on constraint semirings [4,13], we propose a general framework for a
range of trust and quality values, which we call a Q-algebra. These algebras deﬁne a
framework for quality values that could be combined with many kinds of automata
or calculi. With the aim of making our system suitable for the kinds of applications
we expect to model and of making our system more easily understandable, we have
chosen to base our work on automata. These provide a concrete, intuitively clear,
model of computation, and a structural approach to the analysis of the behaviour
of components and their composition.
Components will be represented by Q-automata [10]. These automata have
an additional cost label on each transition to indicate the impact of taking that
transition on the quality attributes of the system. Most automata models do not
distinguish between the interleaving of two actions and their possible concurrent
occurrence, however in the model proposed here it is possible that concurrent com-
ponents can perform their actions simultaneously without having to synchronise
(e.g., in a communication). Therefore, the resource usage of an application can be
quite diﬀerent depending on whether the smallest units of abstraction happen at
the same time or one after the other. For instance, given two transitions, both of
which “cost” a certain amount of bandwidth, measured in Kbit/s, running both at
the same time will require the sum of the two individual costs, whereas running
them one after the other will only cost the maximum of the two individual costs.
Time costs on the other hand will sum sequentially, but not concurrently and we
may choose to model memory allocation costs by summing them both concurrently
and sequentially.
We extend Q-automata to pass names from a ﬁnite domain of values in a similar
way as non-value passing process calculi are often extended to value passing versions,
c.f. [20]. We also deﬁne strong bisimulation as an equivalence relation for the
(extended) Q-automata model that requires matching costs on transitions.
We deﬁne Component Secrecy Degree and Variable Secrecy Degree to measure
how well a model of a component keeps its secrets from any attacker who can
interact with the component and monitor its resource usages. We do not consider
an attacker that can examine the source code of a component, we are interested in
modelling attackers that are other components running on the same computer as the
target and so they can only use the standard communication channels and monitor
the resource usage of other components. A component has prefect secrecy if any two
instances of that component, observed by the attacker, are bisimilar for any possible
secret values. The degrees of secrecy give a measure of how much information
about the components secrets are leaked. This is similar to the approach of [11] in
measuring anonymity degrees. We use the μCRL toolset [5] for performing state
space reduction modulo bisimulation [6], which we use along with some purpose-
built scripts to generate all possible cases of the model and to calculate degrees of
secrecy.
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Main contributions.
The contributions of this work include
• a resource aware automata model of components with secrets,
• a corresponding deﬁnition of secrecy and a method of checking it via bisimulation,
• a tool to automatically check our measures of secrecy (based on μCRL).
Related work.
Weighted automata have a simple weight or cost on each transition and have
been extensively studied since the early days of computer science [14,22]. Our
automata model diﬀers from weighted automata by using a Q-algebra to provide
the costs; this allows us to deﬁne a truly compositional model of the resource usage
of components. Timed automata models label transitions with costs representing
the time they take [1]. Priced or weighted timed automata [2,3] model time using
clocks and have costs on states and transitions. The cost of each transition is paid
each time the transition is made whereas the costs of each state is paid once for each
time unit the automata spends in that state. This provides an expressive model of
costs and time that is, in many cases, undecidable [8]. Our model is also similar to
some process calculi, such as CCS [19], one of the main diﬀerences, apart from the
automata setting, is that we allow multisets of actions to happen at the same time.
In the context of computer security, there are several papers on modelling re-
source consumptions of diﬀerent execution scenarios, [9,17]. A conceptual diﬀerence
between our work and these papers is that they mainly focus on measuring the re-
sources consumed by the attacker in an attack, whereas we allow the attacker to
measure the resources consumed by the target system, and possibly use it to launch
an attack. In this respect, our work is close to the body of research on side channel
and timing attacks [15,18,21].
Structure of the paper.
In the next section we introduce our automata model and cost algebra. In
Section 3 we extend these automata to pass values and deﬁne secrecy degrees for
these values. Section 4 introduces our automatic tool to check secrecy. Finally
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Q-Automata: Modelling Resource Usage
Our model of resource aware components uses values from a Q-algebra to label the
transitions of an automaton.
2.1 Q-algebra
To compute and analyse QoS values in a standard way, we develop a general frame-
work as in the approach of De Nicola et al. [13]. First we recall the concept of a
constraint semiring:
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Deﬁnition 2.1 A constraint semiring is a structure R = (C,⊕,⊗,0,1) where C is
a set, 0,1 ∈ C, and ⊕ and ⊗ are binary operations on C such that:
— ⊕ is commutative, associative, idempotent and has identity 0
— ⊗ is associative and has identity 1
— ⊗ distributes over ⊕ and has 0 as an absorbing (zero) element
Note that for a constraint semiring (or c-semiring, for short) as above, the
operation ⊕ induces a partial order ≤ on C deﬁned by a ≤ b if and only if a⊕ b = b.
Moreover, two elements are comparable with respect to ≤ if and only if application
of ⊕ to these elements yields one (the larger w.r.t. ≤) of the two. Actually, ⊕
always yields the least upper bound of the elements to which it is applied.
Constraint semirings can be used to compose QoS values with “addition” ⊕ to
select among values and “multiplication” ⊗ to combine them. Given an action of
cost c1 and another action with cost c2 then the cost of both actions together is
c1 ⊗ c2, whereas ⊕ returns the least upper bound of c1 and c2. The 0 element, as
the identity of ⊕, is the least possible cost value and the 1 element, as the identity
of ⊗, is the neutral cost value.
A few examples:
— (shortest) time: (R+ ∪ {∞}, min,+,∞, 0)
— bandwidth: (N ∪ {∞}, min, max,∞, 0)
— data encrypted: ({true, false},∨,∧, false, true)
— access control: (2U ,∪,∩, ∅, U), where U is the set of all users and 2U is the
powerset of U .
Constraint semirings work well when there is just one way to combine quality
values. We may use these values to represent the cost of a method call, a sequence
of reduction steps or the cost to execute an entire program. When dealing with a
number of concurrent processes these steps may take place sequentially or in parallel
and these two ways of combining actions might have very diﬀerent overall results
on the resource usage of the system. For instance, two processes that both require
a certain number of CPU cycles per second will require a higher number of cycles
per second when run at the same time than when run one after the other. We
can model these diﬀerent ways of combining values by adding a new multiplicative
operator:
Deﬁnition 2.2 A Q-algebra is a structure R = (C,⊕,⊗,,0,1) such that R⊗ =
(C,⊕,⊗,0,1) and R = (C,⊕,,0,1) are c-semirings. C is called the domain of
R.
The  operator is used to combine two values concurrently: c1c2 is the cost of
c1 and c2 at the same time. The ⊗ operator combines values sequentially: c1⊗ c2 is
the cost of c1 followed by c2. Combining costs concurrently or sequentially will not
aﬀect the least or neutral cost elements so the two operations share their identities.
As before, ⊕ is used to select between values. For example:
— (shortest) time: (R+ ∪ {∞}, min,+, max,∞, 0)
— bandwidth: (N ∪ {∞}, min, max,+,∞, 0)
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2.2 Q-Automata
In this section we introduce Q-automata. These consist of an initialised labelled
transition system together with a (labelled) Q-algebra to specify the cost of each
transition. Note that each transition is labelled with a multiset of actions as a
representation of simultaneous and multiple occurrences of actions. A multiset over
a set X is a function m : X → N and the set of all multisets over X is denoted by
M(X). For two multisets m1 and m2 over X, their sum m1 + m2 is the multiset
over X deﬁned by (m1 + m2)(x) = m1(x) + m2(x).
Deﬁnition 2.3 A Q-automaton is a structure P = 〈S, t,A,R, T 〉 where:
— S is a ﬁnite set of states,
— t ∈ S is its initial state,
— A is a (ﬁnite) set of action names,
— R = (C,⊕,⊗,,0,1) is a labelled QoS algebra with domain C of costs,
— and T ⊆ S ×M(Act)× C × S is the set of transitions.
The set of actions of P , written Act, is derived from the set of action names A in
the following way: each name a ∈ A can occur as an input action (denoted a?), an
output action (denoted a!) or as an internal action (also denoted by a). We thus
obtain AO = {a! : a ∈ A}, the set of output actions of P , AI = {a? : a ∈ A}, the
set of input actions of P , and Aτ = A the set of internal actions of P . The sets AO,
AI , and Aτ are assumed to be pairwise disjoint. Finally, we let Act = AO∪AI ∪Aτ .
The (ﬁnite) computations of Q-automata are deﬁned in the standard way.
Deﬁnition 2.4 Let P be a Q-automaton speciﬁed as in Deﬁnition 2.3. A computa-
tion (of length n ≥ 0) starting from a state s0 ∈ S is a sequence (s0,m1, c1, s1), . . . ,
(sn−1,mn, cn, sn) with (si,mi, ci, si+1) ∈ T for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. If n = 0, then the
computation is the empty sequence.
Based on the Q-algebra and the costs of the transitions, we can compute the
cost for each computation.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Let γ = (s0,m1, c1, s1), . . . , (sn−1,mn, cn, sn) be a computation as
speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 2.4. Then the cost of γ is 1, if n = 0 and c1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ cn if
n ≥ 1.
So, the cost of a computation (a sequence of transitions) is computed using the
“sequential multiplication” operator ⊗. Note that to compare the costs of diﬀerent
computations, the additive (selection) operation ⊕ can be used since it yields the
least upper bound of the given values. “Concurrent multiplication”  is used when
Q-automata collaborate in a composite automaton (their product). This product
automaton has as its Q-algebra the product of the Q-algebras of its components.
Its state space is the Cartesian product of the state spaces of its components and
its transitions are combinations of the components’ transitions, as deﬁned below.
In the formal deﬁnition of product automata, we use an auxiliary function sync,
which in turn uses a relation ⇒ over pairs of multisets of actions such that the pair
on the left equals the pair on right except one input on a name in one multiset
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and one output on the same name in the other multiset have been removed and a
communication on that name has been added.
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let A be a set of action names, Act be its associated set of ac-
tions as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 2.3 and m1 and m2 be two multisets over Act. Then
(m1,m2)⇒ (m
′
1,m
′
2) if either there exists an a ∈ A such that:
— m1(a?) ≥ 1 and m2(a!) ≥ 1
— m′1(a) = m1(a) + 1 and m
′
1(a?) = m1(a?)− 1,
— m′2(a!) = m2(a!)− 1,
— and m′1(b) = m1(b) and m
′
2(b) = m2(b) for all other actions b ∈ Act.
or if (m2,m1) ⇒ (m
′
2,m
′
1) as above.
Let ⇒∗ be the reﬂexive, transitive closure of ⇒. Then
sync(m1,m2) = {m
′
1 + m
′
2 : for all m
′
1,m
′
2 such that (m1,m2) ⇒
∗ (m′1,m
′
2)}.
Thus sync(m,m′) is the set of all multisets that can be obtained by adding m
and m′ with any possible combination of communications between them. Note that
⇒∗ in particular allows the multisets not to communicate at all.
Deﬁnition 2.7 Let P1 = 〈S1, t1, A1, R, T1〉 and P2 = 〈S2, t2, A2, R, T2〉 be two Q-
automata. Then their product, denoted by P1  P2, is the Q-automaton deﬁned as
P1  P2 = 〈S, t,A,R, T 〉 with
— S = S1 × S2,
— t = (t1, t2),
— A = A1 ∪A2,
— T = T new1 ∪ T
new
2 ∪ T
joint where:
• T new1 = {((s, t),m, c, (s
′, t)) : (s,m, c, s′) ∈ T1 and t ∈ S2},
• T new2 = {((s, t),m, c, (s, t
′)) : s ∈ S1 and (t,m, c, t
′) ∈ T2}, and
• T joint = {((s, t),m, c, (s′, t′)) : ∃(s,m1, c1, s
′) ∈ T1, (t,m2, c2, t
′) ∈ T2 such
that m ∈ sync(m1,m2) and c = c1  c2}.
In some cases we may want to impose a more restrictive model of communi-
cation on our automata, for instance we might want to require that only a single
automaton can receive on a given channel or we might want to test our automata
in the knowledge that no other automaton will ever be listening on some channel.
We can do this by blocking all transitions that involve a given (internal, input, or
output) action.
Deﬁnition 2.8 Let P = 〈S, t,A,R, T 〉 be a Q-automaton and let α ∈ AO∪AI ∪Aτ
be an action of P . Then P\α, the restriction of P with respect to α, is the Q-
automaton 〈S, t,A,R, T ′P 〉 with T
′
P = {(s,m, c, s
′) : (s,m, c, s′) ∈ TP and m(α) =
0}. We deﬁne P \ ∅ = P and P \ ({α} ∪ Y ) = (P \ α) \ Y .
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3 Secret Values
3.1 Value Passing Q-automata
This subsection provides the additional machinery that we need to deﬁne and test
secret values. We extend Q-automata to pass names from an ordered, ﬁnite data
domain of values. We add a ﬁnite set of variables V and a ﬁnite domain of values D
to the deﬁnition of Q-automata. Our deﬁnitions can naturally be extended to cover
cases where diﬀerent variables have separate, yet ﬁnite, data domains. However,
to keep the presentation simple, we conﬁne to the single value domain case in this
paper. Below, we use x, y, . . . to refer to variables, d1, d2, . . . are elements of the
data domain and n1, n2, . . . refer to either a variables or an element of the domain.
Deﬁnition 3.1 An extended Q-automata is a structure Pe = 〈S, t,A,R,D, T 〉
where:
— S is a ﬁnite set of states,
— t ∈ S is its initial state,
— A is a (ﬁnite) set of action names,
— R = (C,⊕,⊗,,0,1) is a labelled QoS algebra with domain C of costs,
— D a ﬁnite domain of data values,
— and T ⊆ S ×M(Act)× C × S is the set of transitions.
The set of actions of P , written Act , contains four types of actions: Input on a name
from a segment of the domain a?(x)[d1, . . . , d2], output on a name a!(n1), internal
action on a name a(n1), and conditionals on data values if (n1 = n2) as well as
if (n1 = n2).
1
The input action a?(x) “binds” the variable x. We say that a variable is “free”
in a multiset of actions if it is used in an output or in a conditional but is not bound
by an input. Furthermore, we say that a variable is free from a given state if there
exists a trace, starting at that state, in which the variable appears free before it is
bound.
Below we deﬁne well-formed extended Q-automata.
Deﬁnition 3.2 An extended Q-automata P is well-formed if
• None of the multisets of actions, on the transitions, bind the same variable more
than once.
• There are no free names from the start state.
From now on, we only consider well-formed extended Q-automata. We deﬁne
the semantics of value passing automata by mapping them back into the non-value
passing automata. We do this by mapping each combination of name and data value
to a single name. For instance, the input action a?(x)[1,. . . ,4] would be mapped
to four diﬀerent input actions a 1?, · · · , a 4?, where each of these is a variable-free
action in the basic system. To translate the “if ” condition, we test the values and
1 This can in principle be easily extended to any Boolean function as conditionals.
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if the condition holds then we replace it with an empty transition otherwise we
remove it.
We record the mappings from variables to values using a partial function σ :
V → D. An action a?(x)[d1, · · · , dn] and a partial function σ are compatible if
σ(x) ∈ {d1, · · · , dn}, we write a σ(x)? for [a?(x)[d1, · · · , dn]]σ, when σ is compatible
with the action. For example if σ = {(x, 4)}, then [a?(x)[1, · · · , 5]]σ is written as
a 4?. We note that given a partial function σ that does not map x to a value, the
smallest extensions of σ that are compatible with the action a?(x)[d1, · · · , dn] are
σ ∪ {x → d1}, . . . , σ ∪ {x → dn}.
For output actions [a]σ is obtained by simultaneously substituting all variables
for their values and forming the matching single output name. For instance, given
a!(x) and σ = {(x, 3)}, we have [a!(x)]σ = a 3!. We extend these deﬁnitions to
multisets of actions in a natural way. Note that the well-formedness conditions
mean that there is no conﬂict between variable names.
Deﬁnition 3.3 Given an extended Q-automaton Pe = 〈Se, te, Ae, Re,De, Te〉 we
deﬁne its mapping to a basic Q-automata [[Pe]] = 〈S, (te, ∅), Ae, Re, T 〉 as follows:
Each state in S is a pair (se, σ), where se ∈ Se and σ : V → D is a partial function
that assigns concrete values to members of V . We deﬁne S and T to be the smallest
sets such that:
• (te, ∅) ∈ S
• For all (s, σ) ∈ S and for all (s,m, c, s′) ∈ Te:
· either there exists an “if” condition in m which is false using σ
· or we remove the names bound by m from σ and deﬁne S to be the set of the
smallest extensions of that substitution that are compatible with m, then for
all σ′ ∈ S:
((s, σ), [m]σ′ , c, (s
′, σ′′)) ∈ T and (s′, σ′′) ∈ S
where σ′′ equals σ′ with all names that are not free from state s′ removed.
The removal of the names from σ′ ensures that irrelevant extensions to the
substitution mapping do not lead to more states than are necessary.
A parameterised Q-automata Pe(x1, . . . , xn) is an extended Q-automata that
has free variables in its computations, hence it is not well-formed. However, an
instantiated Pe(x1, . . . , xn) with a mapping σ0 = {(x1, d1), · · · , (xn, dn)} is well-
formed and can be translated to a basic Q-automata [[Pe(d1, . . . , dn)]] with starting
the procedure introduced in Deﬁnition 3.3 with the initial state (t, σ0), instead of
(t, ∅).
3.2 Hiding and Bisimulation
We do not want the attacker to be able to observe the internal actions of any
automaton, therefore we deﬁne a hiding operator that removes the names from the
internal actions but leaves the transition and its costs.
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Deﬁnition 3.4 Given a Q-automata P (x) = 〈S, t,A,R, T 〉 and a set of inter-
nal names I, the automata that results from hiding these names is P (x){I} =
〈S, t, (A\I), R, T ′〉 where:
T ′ = {(s,m′, c, s′) : (s,m, c, s′) ∈ T and for all a ∈ I. m′(a) = m′(a!) = m(a?) = 0
and m(b) = m′(b) for all b = a }
We deﬁne strong bisimulation for automata with costs as follows:
Deﬁnition 3.5 We say two Q-automata P1 = 〈S1, t1, A1, R1, T1〉 and P2 =
〈S2, t2, A2, R2, T2〉 are bisimilar, denoted by P1 ∼ P2, iﬀ
• for all (t1,m, c, s1) ∈ T1, then there exists (t2,m, c, s2) ∈ T2 such that
〈S1, s1, A1, R1, T1〉 and 〈S2, s2, A2, R2, T2〉 are bisimilar.
• for all (t2,m, c, s2) ∈ T2, then there exists (t1,m, c, s1) ∈ T1 such that
〈S2, s2, A2, R2, T2〉 and 〈S1, s1, A1, R1, T1〉 are bisimilar.
Two extended automata are bisimilar if their mappings into the basic automata
are also bisimilar. We note that this deﬁnition requires the names and the costs on
an action to match, therefore if two automata perform the same actions at diﬀerent
costs they are not bisimilar.
The equivalence used in the veriﬁcation of secrecy models the observation power
of the intruder. We use bisimulation to equate processes; this is in contrast to some
previous work that used trace equivalence for secrecy, e.g. see [12]. While it is often
possible, in an asynchronous setting, to implement processes in such a way that an
intruder cannot tell the diﬀerence between two processes that are trace equivalent
but not bisimilar, there also exist reasonable implementations in which the intruder
can tell the diﬀerence. For instance, the two processes a.(b + c) and a.b + a.c are
trace equivalent but not bisimilar. A reasonable implementation of these processes
might use sockets for communication, in which case the ﬁrst process would listen on
port “a” for a message and then listen on ports “b” and “c” and accept only the ﬁrst
message that arrives. The second process could be implemented by either listening
on port “a” and then port “b” or listening on port “a” and then port “c”. All an
intruder has to do to tell these processes apart is to send on port “a” and then on
port “b”. If the intruder can connect on port “b” they learn nothing, however if
they ﬁnd that port “b” is not open then they know that they are dealing with the
second process. In this sense, using bisimulation rather than trace equivalence is a
conservative decision; while it is possible for processes that are trace equivalent, but
not bisimilar, to be safe, we cannot guarantee that they do not reveal information
to the intruder.
A second advantage of using bisimulation is that it can be much more eﬃcient
to check. The added restrictions on bisimilar processes mean that we can reject
certain paths as not bisimilar long before we could detect that they are not trace
equivalent. In the most extreme cases checking a particular pair of processes for
trace equivalence can take exponential time while checking the same processes for
bisimulation being linear time, e.g. see [16].
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3.3 Secrecy Degree
We say that a variable x in the automata P (x) is kept secret if for any two possible
values d1 and d2 for x it holds that P (d1){I} is bisimilar to P (d2){I} where I is
the set of the internal names.
Diﬀerent instantiations of an automaton are split into diﬀerent equivalence
classes whose members are all bisimilar. The Component Secrecy Degree measures
the smallest of these classes. This represents the most that an attacker could de-
duce about the automata’s secret (input) based on its communication and resource
usage. Below, z denotes a vector of z values.
Deﬁnition 3.6 [Component Secrecy Degree]
The component secrecy degree (csd) of an automata P (z) with respect to a set
of internal names I is:
csd = min
d1
| {d2 : [[P (d1)]]{I} ∼ [[P (d2)]]{I} } |
The best possible Component Secrecy Degree would be |D|n where n is the size
of z and |D| is the size of the domain. So we will sometimes write the component
secrecy degree as csd : |D|n.
In the case that only one of our inputs needs to be kept secret we use Variable
Secrecy Degree:
Deﬁnition 3.7 [Variable Secrecy Degree]
The variable secrecy degree (vsd) for the ith variable of automata P (z) with
respect to a set of internal names I is:
vsd(i) = min
d
| {di : ∃d1, . . . , dn [[P (d1, . . . , di, . . . , dn)]]{I} ∼ [[P (d)]]{I} } |
The Variable Secrecy Degree quantiﬁes the secrecy of just one input value. The
best possible Variable Secrecy Degree would be |D|. So we for the value secrecy
degree will sometimes write vsd : |D|. Note that csd is in fact an upper bound
on vsd values, i.e. ∀i. vsd(i) ≤ csd . This is because csd is the size of the smallest
equivalence class whose members are indistinguishable for the attacker. Clearly,
the number of diﬀerent values that the ith variable may take in this class cannot be
larger than the size of the class.
We may use restriction to test conditions on automata. For instance if we have
a booking agent component that may make purchases on our behalf, then we could
check that it does not leak our credit card number without making a purchase by
checking the variable secrecy degree for the credit card number in the automata
restricted on the purchase action.
We conjecture that the secrecy degrees are fully compositional properties, i.e.
for any automata P (x){I} and PA, the secrecy degrees of P (x){I} × PA are not
less than the corresponding secrecy degrees of P (x). Similarly, the secrecy degrees
of P (x){I}\Aα, where Aα denotes a set of restricted actions, is not less than those
of P (x){I}. This means that we can quickly build up quite complex models and
check combinations of systems. We leave a formal treatment of this conjecture as
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p1 p2 pn
P(p1) P(p2) P(pn)
. . . .
pnp1 p2
. . . . . 
. . . . .
Fig. 1. Checking Secrecy Using State Space Reduction
future work.
4 Automatically Checking Secrecy in μCRL
Our deﬁnitions of secrecy require us to check bisimulations between every possible
pair of automata inputs. Doing this by hand would not be easy, therefore we develop
a tool to do this for us.
The user speciﬁes an extended Q-automata, the ﬁnite domain of its variables,
and the names that need to be restricted and the internal names. Our scripts
generate all possible basic Q-automata for all possible variable values, and also hide
and restrict the names. We then test all the possible bisimulations in one go via
“state space reduction modulo bisimulation”, see [7].
We illustrate our method in Figure 1. We make use of this to test an automaton
P (x) by generating one large automaton that has one transition from the start
state for each possible input value, and these transitions go to a sub automata that
behave as P would on that input. More formally:
Given an extended automata P (x), a domain of variables {d1, . . . , dn} and a set
of internal names I, we generate all corresponding basic Q-automata for all possible
inputs: [[P (d1)]]{I} = 〈S1, t1, A1, R, T1〉, · · · , [[P (dn)]]{I} = 〈Sn, tn, An, R, Tn〉. We
then generate an automaton that branches to each of these automata from a start
state: P = 〈S, t′, A,R, T 〉 where:
• S = S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn ∪ {t
′}
• A = A1 ∪ . . . ∪An ∪ {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
• T = T1 ∪ . . . ∪ Tn ∪ {(t
′, i,1, ti) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}
This automaton is illustrated on the left of Figure 1. We perform state space
reduction modulo bisimulation on this large automaton. 2 If a number of values
the P (x) automata are bisimilar then the state space reduction will produce an
automaton that takes the initial transition with the value labels to the same state.
If the result is a system in which all of the initial transitions go to the same state,
as illustrated on the right of Figure 1, we know that P (x) is bisimilar for all values
of x, i.e. we have perfect secrecy. If the transitions go to a number of distinct states
2 State space reduction modulo bisimulation reduces an automaton to a smaller automaton that is bisimilar.
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Fig. 2. An Example Extended Q-Automaton
then the attacker can learn something about the input.
We can measure how much the attacker learns using our secrecy degree, which
we can read oﬀ from the simpliﬁed automaton. If we look at the set of labels on the
transitions that go to the same state after simpliﬁcation as equivalence classes then
the component secrecy degree is the size of the smallest class. To ﬁnd the variable
secrecy degree it is necessary to look at each of the equivalence classes in turn and
ﬁnd the one that has the smallest number of possible values for the given variable.
This smallest number of possible diﬀerent values is the variable secrecy degree.
4.1 Example
We illustrate the details of our method with a simple example. Figure 2 shows an
extended Q-automaton that two “choices” parameters (numbers between 1 and 3,
which are diﬀerent) and a credit card number parameter (either cc1 or cc2). It
then inputs a number on the channel ch that represents what the environment is
oﬀering. If this number matches one of the two choices, the component reports the
oﬀer back to its owner on a private channel (this is an internal action) and if the
owner conﬁrms, it releases the credit card number. In order to automatically check
our extended Q-automata we write them in Aldebaran like format:
(0,"ch?(x)[1,2,3]",16,1) (1,"if (x=1stchoice)",-16,2)
(1,"if (x=/=1stchoice)",-16,3) (3,"if (x=2ndchoice)",-8,2)
(3,"if (x=/=2ndchoice)",-8,4) (4,"fail",0,0)
(2,"offer",2,5) (5,"comfirm",-2,6)
(6,"ch!<cc>",0,0)
The ﬁrst thing we can check is that the credit card number is kept secret unless
the owner conﬁrms its release. So we test the automata restricted on the conﬁrm
action hoping to ﬁnd that the credit card number does not then aﬀect the behaviour
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{}{}
2k
{}
{offer }
2k
{}
{}
{fail}
Fig. 3. An Basic Q-Automaton Example
of the automaton. To test this secrecy we need to translate the restricted automata
into a basic Q-automaton, this is done for the inputs cc1,1,2 in Figure 3.
By replacing the multiset of actions with an ordered list of actions and appending
the costs to this list we can write down these basic automata in the Aldebaran
like format. For instance, the automata in Figure 3 would be written as:
(0,"ch_1_16k?",1) (0,"ch_2_16k?",2)
(0,"ch_3_16k?",3) (1,"-16k",4)
(2,"-8k",5) (3,"-8k",6)
(4,"offer_2k",7) (5,"-8k",8)
(6,"-8k",9) (8,"offer_2k",10)
(9,"fail_0k",0)
We have written a Perl script that, given a value passing Q-automaton and
information on the domains of its variables, generates the large automaton that
includes all possible inputs, as described in Section 4, we then use μCRL toolset to
perform state space reduction modulo strong bisimulation. Finally another script
reads oﬀ our secrecy values by looking at all the transitions from the start state in
the reduced version of the automaton.
When analysing the example in Figure 2 we ﬁnd that, as expected, the credit
card value is kept secret (vsd(1) = 2 : 2) however we also ﬁnd that the choices are not
secret at all (vsd(2) = vsd(3) = 1 : 3). On closer inspection we can see that the ﬁrst
and second choices can be distinguished by the way in which memory is deallocated.
If the environment provides the component’s ﬁrst choice then the component will
stop its search and deallocate 16k in one go, whereas if the environment oﬀers the
2nd choice value then the component will deallocate 8k followed by another 8k.
It is up to the user of our tools to decide if leaking information about a particular
variable is a problem or not. In this case we may restore some secrecy to the choices
by deallocating the memory in the same way for each choice, as done in Figure
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Fig. 4. An Example Extended Q-Automaton That Hides the Choices
4. For this automata our tools tell us that vsd(1) = 2 : 2, vsd(2) = 2 : 3 and
vsd(3) = 2 : 3. While this is not perfect secrecy, these increased secrecy degrees
show that the attacker cannot learn which value was the ﬁrst choice and which was
the second.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a method for automatically checking the secrecy of values inside
components, even when the attacker can monitor resource usage. We base our
framework on Q-automata and Q-algebras to provide a simple model of components
and a wide range of possible costs. We use scripts and μCRL to automatically
calculate our measures of secrecy degree from an automaton.
This work forms part of the analysis methods developed within the Trust4All
project. This is an ITEA project aimed at developing a programming environment
for “trusted” components that will come with information on their resource us-
age. The methods and tools presented here will be used to check real components
developed as part of this project.
We are currently developing an Eclipse based graphical user interface to make
building the automata models easier. Figures 2 and 4 are in fact screen shots of
our editor. We will integrate our scripts for running μCRL and calculating the
security values into this framework and make it publicly available. We are also
interested in looking at more ﬂexible ways of matching costed transitions. One
possibility might be to use an approximate bisimulation to allow a margin of error
when matching transitions. Another direction might be to deﬁne a bisimulation that
allows a number of transitions in one system to be matched by another number of
transitions in the other system. For instance, when modelling time we could allow
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two sequential ﬁve-second transitions to look the same as one ten-second transition.
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